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Banking and Venture Capital
At present, the ability of banks in the United
States to invest in commercial enterprises is
limited. Although they are allowed to extend
loans to industrial firms, they may not hold
controlling amounts of equity in such firms nor
simultaneously lend to a commercial firm and
hold its equity. An earlier Letter argued that these
restrictions on bank powers may handicap the
ability of banks to finance productive business
ventures in our economy.
This Letter discusses the importance of risk
control mechanisms in lending to business ven-
tures. Venture capital financing techniques illus-
trate the kinds of control mechanisms needed to
finance risky projects safely. A comparison ofthe
financial instruments used by venture capitalists
with those available to u.s. banks suggests that
banks' limited powers may contribute to low
rates of business investment in our economy.
The hazard of lending
Both venture capital firms and commercial
banks are in the business of funding commercial
ventures. They both assess and manage the risks
associated with their investments, but they differ
significantly in the types of instruments they are
permitted to use to manage risk.
Banks in the U.S. generally are restricted
by regulation to providing pure external debt
financing to a firm. ("External" here refers
to funding that is provided by those who do not
have access to the information about a firm's
prospects that is available to the firm's "insiders;'
or managers.) In addition to the normal uncer-
tainty concerning the payoffs associated with
risky projects, external finance is risky because
of information asymmetries and the "moral haz-
ard" problem inherent in this type of lending.
Specifically, since borrowing firms have a better
understanding of their prospects than do out-
siders, they may exploit this information asym-
metry to obtain financing terms that do not
adequately compensate the lender for the risks
being undertaken.
In addition, external creditors also face risks
associated with a "moral hazard" problem.
Specifically, borrowers have an incentive to use
funds obtained from external sources to finance
a riskier project than originally envisioned since
any upside benefits are captured entirely by the
equity holders of the firm, while downside risks
are shared with the lender. The thinner is the
equity position ofthe firm's insiders, the greater
is this moral hazard problem.
To control these risks associated with pure debt
financing, u.s. banks generally limit their loan
clients to well-capitalized, established firms
selling established products or to firms with
ample collateral. Unfortunately, these are pre-
cisely the firms best positioned to bypass the
bank loan market altogether by issuing their debt
directly to investors in the form of commercial
paper or bonds. The high net worth of these firms
reduces the moral hazard problem for outside
debt holders, and in recent years, improvements
in information and instrumentation technology
have helped to reduce problems with information
asymmetries and have made direct placement of
debt more feasible.
At the other end ofthe spectrum of potential
loan clients are entrepreneurial firms selling new
products. They are, by definition, firms with little
or no current cash flow to support debt obliga-
tions. High quality information may be impossi-
ble or very costly to obtain externally, and the
thin veneer of equity typically provided by the
entrepreneur creates a serious moral hazard
problem that must be controlled by the outside
investor. On account ofthe significant informa-
tional and moral hazard challenges these firms
pose, loans to such firms are not attractive in-
vestments for banks, despite the high expected
returns.
Venture capitalists
The venture capital industry has evolved as
a specialist in intermediation to these thinly-





The role of banks
That the venture capital industry employs
instruments other than simple debt raises the
logical question whether the economy would
benefit if banks enjoyed similar flexibility in their
financial relationships with firms. At present,
commercial banks are confined to a shrinking
middle ground between the direct placement
debt market and the market served by financiers
like venture capitalists, who enjoy equity
powers. On the one hand, direct placement
activity has diminished banks' role in funding
low-risk credits, while restricted equity powers
limit their ability to safely monitor (and therefore,
provide funding to) higher-risk credits. As a
result, net new bank lending to business has
trended down (in inflation-adjusted terms); in
contrast, the flow of venture capital financing
commitments and bond financing has exhibited
a general upward trend. (See the chart.)
than anticipated. This feature gives the entre-
preneur an incentive to pursue the project
aggressively.
In addition to embedding these control features
in their outside positions, venture capitalists usu-
ally obtain inside (management) rights in return
for their significant equity positions. These may
be the right to appoint one or more directors or
to serve as an officer of the company. These
management rights are an important hallmark
of venture capitalism, and provide channels for
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venture capitalists are largely unrestricted in
terms of the financial relationship they may
establish with their customers. Venture capitalists
thus are able to devise instruments to control the
informational and moral hazard problems inher-
ent in such lending.
Not surprisingly, simple coupon debt is an
uncommon mode of venture finance, except for
the financing of mature venture firms. Where
debt is issued, it takes the form of a hybrid of
debt and equity that combines equity conversion
or detachable stock warrant features with the
underlying debt. Like the mixed debt/equity
("strip") financing employed in industrial take-
overs in recent years, such instruments let the
lender participate in the "upside" of any risk-
taking. In the process, the entrepreneur's incen-
tive to exploit the moral hazard problem is
partially dampened.
For the riskiest ventures (that is, the ones that
are verythinly-capitalized and have no earnings
track record), simple combinations of outside
debt and equity do not provide sufficient control.
Such firms are very difficult to monitor externally,
and the risk that inside equity holders will exploit
outside financiers simply is too great to be held
in check by the rather blunt powers afforded
lenders or simple equity holders.
As a result, venture capitalists typically seek
financing mechanisms that provide additional
control and insider-like information. This financ-
ing generally takes the form of convertible pre-
ferred stock. The preferred stock position gives
the venture capitalist some debt-like priority over
common stock holders, while the requirement
that the preferred stock be convertible to com-
mon equity provides opportunities to enjoy the
greater upside potential of common stock.
The preferred stock position often includes
special rights, such as Iiquidation priority,
which offers priority over other equity holders
in liquidation, and thereby provides the venture
capitalist with worst-case, downside protection.
In addition, the preferred stock often includes
redemption rights, which are intended to encour-
age on-going performance. These rights require
that the firm cash out the venture capitalist at a
premium over the value ofthe initial investment
if, by a certain time, performance has been lessIf banks were given expanded equity powers,
the broadest opportunities for banks likely would
not be in venture capital per se, but in more
extensive involvement with their current credit
customers. In Germany and Japan, for example,
where banks' powers are less restricted, banks
provide roughly twice the proportion oftotal in-
dustrial credit that banks in the U.S. provide.
Nonetheless, it is also likely that banks would
become more involved in providing true venture
funding. Indeed, since banks perform the same
essential monitoring function as the venture
capitalist, and have superior access to debt and
equity markets, they may even come to dominate
traditional venture financing channels.
Foreign evidence
Evidence from other countries appears to confirm
the potential for a significantly increased role for
banks in venture finance if current restrictions
on equity-holding and exercise of control were
relaxed. In France, Germany, and Italy, for exam-
ple, where banks do enjoy such powers, they
provided 35, 45, and 65 percent of total venture
funding in 1985, respectively. By comparison,
banks provide less than five percent of venture
funding in the United States, and this primarily
arises from the activity of Small Business Invest-
ment Company (SBIC) subsidiaries. (SBICs are
special entities licensed by the Small Business
Administration to pass through debt funding.)
In Japan, banks nominally have narrower powers
than do the European banks, but institutional
arrangements provide a channel for risk control
analogous to that provided by venture capital
institutions in the U.S. Specifically, large portions
of industry are interconnected through group
affiliations (kieretsu) and cross-shareholding rela-
tionships (mochiai), and banks and insurance
companies hold over 40 percent of all corporate
equity. Another 30 percent is held by other
corporations.
On account of these relationships, it is not
surprising that attempts to initiate U.S.-style
venture capital activity in Japan generally have
been unsuccessful. It appears that much new
product development in Japan occurs within
established firms, where the risk offunding new
ventures is controlled by existing relationships.
Implications for the economy
The key concern, of course, is not who supplies
funding to industry, but whether the overall cost
of capital is reduced by one funding structure or
another. Here, both theory and casual empirical
evidence suggest that the U.S. economy may be
handicapped in this regard by restrictions on
bank powers.
It is clear from finance theory that unresolved
information asymmetries are costly to the econ-
omy. As Myers and Majluf have demonstrated,
the existence of information asymmetries leads to
underinvestment since firms are unable to obtain
financing sufficient to pursue all worthwhile
projects; "outside" investors' lack of information
causes them to withhold funding, effectively
raising the cost of capital. To the extent that
improved equity and control powers at banks
would resolve information asymmetries, the cost
of capital would be reduced, and investment in
the economy enhanced.
International comparisons appear to lend some
support to this view. Estimates by Ando and
Auerbach, for example, suggest that the Japanese
cost of capital may have been as little as half that
in the U.S. in the 1967-83 period. Since thev
carefully control for other factors and still the
cost difference persists, Ando and Auerbach
conclude that the difference may have been due
to the "lower risk" of comparable investments in
Japan. This is consistent with the notion that the
kieretsu and mochiai relationships are effective
mechanisms of risk control.
It is also interesting to note that both Germany
and Japan have higher rates of expenditure on
research and development than the U.S. does,
and that spending on plant and equipment is
roughly twice as great in Germany and Japan as
in the U.S., adjusting for the sizes of the respec-
tive economies. Whether this laggard perform-
ance is a manifestation of an "underinvestment"
phenomenon related to inadequate risk-control
powers of banks, of course, is difficult to ascer-
tain. It may suggest, however, that as energetic as
it is, our unique venture capital industry may not
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